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Abstract
We study dealer behavior in the foreign exchange spot market using a detailed data set on
the complete transactions of four dealers. There is strong support for an information effect in
incoming trades. Although there is evidence that the information effect increases with trade
size in direct bilateral trades, the direction of a trade seems to be more important. The large
share of electronically brokered trades is probably responsible for this nding. In direct trades
it is the initiating dealer that determines trade size, while in broker trades it is the dealer sub-
mitting the limit order that determines the maximum trade size. We also nd strong evidence of
inventory control for all the four dealers. Inventory control is not, however, manifested through
a dealer's own prices as suggested in inventory models. This is different from the strong price
effect from inventory control found in previous work by Lyons [J. Fin. Econ 39(1995) 321]. A
possible explanation for this nding is that the introduction of electronic brokers allowed more
trading options. Furthermore, we document differences in trading styles among the four deal-
ers, especially how they actually control their inventories.
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11 Introduction
Short-term exchange rate uctuations are notoriously difcult to explain (see e.g. Frankel and
Rose, 1995). After extensive research over many years few stones have been left unturned when
it comes to investigating the short-term explanatory power of macroeconomic variables. The
microstructure approach to foreign exchange takes a different route and studies the agents that
actually set the exchange rate: the dealers. We study dealer behavior using a very detailed data
set with the complete trading records of four interbank spot foreign exchange dealers during the
week March 26 1998. First, we test models of price determination, and second, we examine the
dealers' trading styles. Our data set contains all relevant information about each trade such as
transaction time, transaction prices and quantities, inventories, trading system used, and who
initiated the trade. Despite the size and importance of foreign exchange (FX) markets, there are
virtually no empirical studies using transaction prices and dealer inventories. A notable excep-
tion, however, is the study by Lyons (1995) using a data set from 1992 on transaction prices and
dealer inventories for one dealer covering a week in August 1992.1
Much empirical work on market microstructure has focused on the specialist at the NYSE.
However, due to its decentralized multiple dealership structure and its low transparency, the FX
market is very different from the specialist structure on the NYSE. Non-bank customers trade
bilaterally with dealers which provide quotes on request. The interdealer market has a hybrid
market structure with two different trading channels available: direct (bilateral) trades and two
options for brokered trades (electronic brokers and the more traditional voice-brokers). The FX
market is also special in the sense that trading is largely unregulated. This means that e.g. low
transparency has evolved endogenously. Details about direct interdealer trades and customer
trades (e.g. bid and ask quotes, the amount and direction of trade) are only observed by the two
counterparties. Brokers are more transparent. Electronic brokers announce best bid and ask prices
and the direction (not amount) of all trades (voice-brokers announce a subset). This information
is, however, only available to the dealers. Electronic brokers have become very popular since their
introduction in 1992 and are now the dominant tool for interdealer trading. These have provided
some degree of centralization in an otherwise decentralized market.
At least two major stock markets, however, the NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange, are
organized as multiple dealership markets. Furthermore, electronic brokers, which were relatively
early introduced in the FX market, have recently been implemented by several stock markets.
There are also many similarities between FX and bond markets, e.g. the UK gilt market studied
by Vitale (1998) and the 5-year Treasury note interdealer broker market studied by Huang, Cai,
and Wang (2002). Hence, our results may apply more broadly than just to FX markets.
Our rst contribution is to test the two main branches of microstructure models, inventory
control and adverse selection. Inventory control models (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho
and Stoll, 1981) focus on how risk-averse dealers adjust prices to control their inventory of an
asset. The idea is that a dealer with a larger inventory of the currency than desired will set a lower
price to attract buyers. This is called quote shading. Information-based models (e.g. Kyle, 1985;
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Admati and Peiderer, 1988) consider learning and adverse selection
problems when some market participants have private information. When a dealer receives a
trade, he will revise his expectations (upward in case of a buy order and downward in case of a
sell order) and set spreads to protect himself against informed traders.
We use different methods to test the two main microstructure models. We start by testing
whetherdealerinventoriesaremeanreverting. Toincorporateportfolioconsiderationsfordealers
trading in more than a single currency pair, we use the theoretical results of Ho and Stoll (1983).
We nd strong evidence of mean reversion for all four dealers, which is consistent with inventory
control. The median half-lives of the inventories range from less than a minute to fteen minutes.
We then use two well-known models to test for inventory and information effects on price. The
rst, the Madhavan and Smidt (1991) model, which is similar to the model used by Lyons (1995),
1Other studies that should be mentioned are Yao (1998a,b) and Mende and Menkhoff (2003).
2receives no support. In addition we use the indicator model suggested by Huang and Stoll (1997).
The current paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst to apply this model to FX markets. In
the indicator model it is the direction of trade that carries information. Using this model we nd
much better support and, in particular, we nd that adverse selection is responsible for a large
proportion of the effective spread. Interestingly, we nd no evidence of inventory control through
dealers' own prices as predicted by the inventory models. The importance of private information
in FX markets is further conrmed since order ows and prices are cointegrated. Cointegration
means that order ows have a permanent effect on prices. Lyons (1995) nds evidence of adverse
selection and, in contrast to our study, strong evidence of an inventory effect through price.
Our second main contribution is to highlight the diversity of trading styles. In particular,
we examine more closely how dealers use different trading options to control their inventories.
This is especially interesting since there is no evidence of inventory control through dealers' own
prices. To understand the lack of any price effect from inventory, it is important to remember the
multiple dealer structure of the market. In a single dealer structure, like the one in the Madhavan
and Smidt (1991) model, the dealer must wait for the next order to arrive. His only possibility
for inventory adjustment is to shade his quotes. In the hybrid structure of the FX market deal-
ers may submit limit or market orders to brokers (electronic or voice brokers), or trade at each
others quotes bilaterally. We nd differences in trading styles among our dealers. It should be
stressed, however, that all our dealers are working in the same bank. Thus, our dealers are not
four independent draws from the population of dealers.
The strong information effect and weak price effect from inventory is similar to evidence in
Vitale (1998) for the UK gilt market and in several studies of stock markets, e.g. Madhavan and
Smidt (1991, 1993) and Hasbrouck and Soanos (1993). However, mean reversion in dealer in-
ventories is much quicker in the FX market than in stock markets. The extremely short half-lives
of a few minutes documented here conrm that inventory control is the name of the game in FX.
The evidence found in this study of strong mean reversion in dealer inventories, but weak inven-
tory effect through price, is consistent with the ndings in Manaster and Mann (1996) for futures
dealers.
Recent studies like Evans and Lyons (2002) have integrated insights from microstructure to ad-
dress the inability of macro models to explain exchange rate changes at frequencies higher than a
year. They demonstrate that daily aggregate order ow may improve explanatory power signi-
cantly. This is a promising direction for FX research. Dealer analysis is likely to prove useful in the
future for formulating realistic micro foundations for this microstructure-macro framework. It is
comforting that the results presented here are consistent with the informational approach Evans
and Lyons assume at the market wide level. Dealer analysis also has a wider scope, however. For
example our results about inventory control have implications for an understanding of the large
trading volumes in FX markets.
The next section describes our data and some important market characteristics of relevance
for our study. Section 3 provides an analysis of dealer inventories. Our investigation of price
effects from information and inventories is presented in section 4. Section 5 examines how the
dealers actually control their inventories using other alternatives than price shading. The paper
ends with conclusions and some directions for future research.
2 Description of data and market
2.1 The structure of the FX market2
The FX market is by far the world largest nancial market, with a daily transaction volume of
USD 1,200 billion (BIS, 2002). The spot market is not largest in size but still regarded as the most
2See Rime (2003) for a more detailed account of FX market structure and trading systems.
3important market with its daily transaction volume of roughly USD 400 million. Since 1992, when
Lyons collected his data set, the market has gone through major structural changes.
As mentioned above, the FX market is organized as a decentralized multiple dealership mar-
ket. In the most active currency pair, USD/EUR (DEM/USD before 1999), there are hundreds of
active dealers located all over the world.3 Dealers give quotes to customers on request through
bilateral conversations. Access to customer orders is regarded as the most important source of
private information. Customer orders may signal changed sentiment, interpretation of public
news, and future risk premia (see Lyons, 2001, for discussion of private information in FX). In the
interdealer market, dealers have access to two different trading channels. First, dealers can trade
directly (bilaterally) with each other, usually over the electronic system Reuters D2000-1 (or less
commonly by phone).4 The initiator of the trade typically requests bid and ask quotes for a certain
amount. If the conversation ends with a trade, it is executed at the bid or the ask (quotes are given
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, leaving no room for improvement). The second channel for trading
is through brokers, which there are two different types of. Voice-brokers are the traditional bro-
kers, and communication takes place through closed radio networks. Most popular today is the
electronic broker systems Reuters D2000-2 and EBS. The dealers use brokers either to post limit
orders or to trade at posted limit orders (market order). The different trading options let dealers
manage their inventory positions in several ways. In addition to adjusting prices in incoming
trades (market making), the dealers may trade at other dealers' quotes (outgoing trades). In an
incoming trade, the price-setting dealer trades at the most favorable side of the bid or ask. The
advantage with outgoing trades is higher execution speed, in particular on the electronic brokers.
There are some noteworthy differences between the trading options. First, direct (or bilateral)
trading is non-anonymous (the dealer sees the identity of the initiator), while in broker trades the
identity of the counterpart is rst revealed after the trade. Second, in direct trades the dealer gives
quotes on request, and the initiator decides when to trade, the quantity traded and the direction
of the trade. Limit orders are more exible because the dealer decides when to post a limit order
and the maximum quantity traded if the limit order is taken. Typically, in direct trades the dealer
is expected to give two-way quotes, while in broker trades this is left to the dealer's discretion
(i.e. he can decide direction as well). Third, dealers in the direct market are committed to provid-
ing quotes at which they are willing to trade, while participation in broker trading is voluntary.
Fourth, transparency differs among the trading channels. As with customer trades, in a direct
trade both prices and transaction volumes are kept secret by the two parties. A voice-broker an-
nounces the best bid and ask prices. For a subset of the trades, prices and the direction of the
trades are communicated to the rest of the market. The electronic brokers announce bid and ask
prices good for ten million euros (for EUR/USD) in addition to the best bid and ask prices and
their respective quantities. Prices and directions for all trades are communicated to the rest of
the market. Fifth, there are differences between voice-brokers and electronic brokers. In addition
to the differences in transparency mentioned above, voice-brokers allow some communication
between the dealers and the broker. For instance, the broker may search for and negotiate with
potential buyers and sellers. The automatic matching on electronic brokers typically makes exe-
cution quicker than for voice-brokers.5
Since electronic brokers were introduced in 1992, their market share has increased rapidly.
According to several surveys, the interdealer market was split evenly between direct trading and
voice-broker trading in 1992 (see Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Cheung and Wong, 2000; Cheung,
Chinn, and Marsh, 2000). In 1998 the market share of the voice-brokers had declined to roughly
15 percent, while the market share of direct trading had declined to roughly 35 percent. The re-
maining 50 percent represents the market share of electronic brokers. According to practitioners,
3We will use the following ISO codes for currencies: USD is US dollar, EUR is euro, DEM is Deutsche mark, NOK is
Norwegian kroner, SEK is Swedish krona, DKK is Danish kroner, and CHF is Swiss franc.
4D2000-1 allows dealers to request or handle quotes with four different counterparts simultaneously. Moreover, the
computerized documentation reduces the paperwork required by the dealers. These advantages explain why almost all
direct interdealer trades are executed using D2000-1 and not by phone or telex as used to be the case.
5Voice-brokers' ability to search for counterparties may be important in less liquid instruments, e.g. options.
4the market share of electronic broker trading has continued to increase. This suggests that the
electronic brokers facilitate risk sharing in a way that was not previously available. Furthermore,
since pre- and post-trade transparency is higher for electronic brokers than for voice-brokers and
direct trades in particular, there is now more price and order ow information available. This in-
creased transparency is, however, only relevant for the interdealer market. Non-bank customers
do not have access to this information.6 Note also that the increased transparency is chosen by
the dealers themselves since they decide which trading system to use.
2.2 Description of the data set
The data set includes transaction prices, quantities and dealer inventories for four spot dealers
working in a large Scandinavian bank for the period 26 March 1998.7 The advantages of such a
data set over other foreign exchange data alternatives (mostly indicative quotes), are that transac-
tion prices better reect market activity, and for a thorough analysis of dealer behavior one needs
inventory observations (Lyons, 1995). Compared with new data sets with transaction prices from
electronic trading systems, e.g. Payne (2003) (D2000-2) and Evans (2002) (D2000-1), our data
set has the advantage that it includes dealer inventories and reects the dealers' choice between
different trading systems. Thus, our data allows a direct test of inventory models and the inves-
tigation of trading strategies.
The data set was constructed by matching two sources: (i) the dealers' records from an inter-
nal system used for controlling inventory positions, and (ii) information from electronic trading
systems on their electronic trading. The rst part of the data set contains all trades, including
direct trades, trades with electronic brokers, trades with voice-brokers, internal trades and cus-
tomer trades. From this component we are able to calculate dealers' inventory positions. There
is information on transaction time, price, volume, counterpart and which currency the dealer
bought and which he sold. Trades executed by electronic systems are electronically entered into
the record. Other trades are entered manually.
The second component of the data set provides detailed information on trades executed on
electronic systems: Reuters D2000-1, Reuters D2000-2 and EBS. The Reuters D2000-1 system pro-
vides the following information: (i) The time the communication is initiated and ended (to the
second); (ii) the name of the counterpart; (iii) who is initiating the trade; (iv) the quantity re-
quested; (v) the bid and ask quotes (may also be only bid or only ask); and if the conversation
results in a trade, (vi) the quantity traded; and (vii) the transaction price. Trades executed by elec-
tronic broker systems (D2000-2 and EBS) provide the same information as the D2000-1 records,
with the exception that only the transaction price, and not the bid-ask spread, can be observed.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports statistics on the four dealers' trading activity measured in USD. Dealers 1, 3
and 4 trade in more than a single currency pair. The remaining dealer, Dealer 2, trades only
in DEM/USD. Dealer 1 is the largest dealer in the NOK/DEM market, and can be labelled the
NOK/DEM Market Maker in our sample. He estimates his market share at roughly 40 percent.
The total trading volume amounts to USD 1,081, with a daily average of USD 216 million. The
majority of his trading is in NOK/DEM. Nevertheless, more than 30 percent of his overall trading
is in other currency pairs. Dealer 2 can be labelled the DEM/USD Market Maker. His total
transaction volume over the week is USD 2,214 million, which gives a daily average of USD 443
million. Compared with the daily trading volume in DEM/USD of USD 150 billion (BIS, 1999)
this gure is small. Nevertheless, among the hundreds of dealers in the DEM/USD market he de-
scribes himself as a medium-sized market maker. The total transaction volume of Dealer 3 is USD
6Customers' ability to see tight spreads from the interdealer market may have increased as Reuters have started selling
quotes from D2000-2.
7We use the term dealers for both market makers and position-taking traders.
5777 million with a daily average of USD 155 million. The majority is in DEM/USD with some
trading in European currency pairs. Due to his active use of electronic brokers we label him the
Nintendo dealer. Dealer 4's total transaction volume is USD 1,106 million, which gives a daily
average of USD 221 million. Most important is trading in DEM/USD. Trading in SEK/DEM, for
which she makes markets, is also important. She is therefore labelled the SEK & USD Dealer.
Table 1: Dealers' trading volumes. March 26 1998
Volume numbers are in USD million. Share of volume in currency pair measures the percentage of overall volume that takes place in the
currency pair.
Dealer 1 Dealer 2 Dealer 3 Dealer 4
Volume (in USD m.) 1,081 2,214 777 1,106
No. of transactions 529 992 514 724
% of volume in currency pair:
DEM/USD 3.7 100.0 91.6 65.0
NOK/DEM 68.6 0.0 0.2 9.1
SEK/DEM 0.7 0.0 0.0 19.7
NOK/USD 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
DKK/DEM 17.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHF/DEM 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0
Other 0.6 0.0 2.0 6.2
Table 2 presents some statistics about the different types of trades. We focus on the most
important currency pair for each dealer, i.e. NOK/DEM for Dealer 1, and on DEM/USD trades
for Dealer 2 to Dealer 4. Volume is in DEM for dealer 1, and in USD for the three other dealers.
Statistics on the dealers are presented in four panels, a-d.
Alldealers havesomedirecttrading, butitisprimarily thetwomarket makers(Dealer1and2)
that trade directly, and particularly Dealer 1. All the direct trading of Dealer 1 and 2 is incoming,
meaning they act as typical market makers, giving prices on request. Since they have no outgoing
direct trades, this means that they have to adjust prices or use brokers to adjust their inventories
after incoming direct trades.
Dealer 3 and 4 rely almost exclusively on electronic broker systems when trading DEM/USD.
Electronic broker systems are also important for the other two dealers, in particular for Dealer 2.8
Voice brokers are only used sparingly by the two market makers, Dealers 1 and 2.
The two market makers (Dealer 1 and 2) trade with non-bank customers. This is most impor-
tant for the NOK/DEM Market Maker (Dealer 1) who has roughly 18 percent of his trading in
NOK/DEM with customers. His trading in other currency pairs is also mainly customer-driven.
Dealers 3 and 4 also have some customer trading, but not in DEM/USD. In fact, most of their
trading in other currency pairs is direct or customer driven.
All dealers have some internal trades, for example trading with other spot dealers or with
option dealers within the bank. Internal trades may be used to adjust inventories. Instead of
trading in the market, they can trade with another dealer in the same bank.
All direct trades and all electronic broker trades are signed as incoming or outgoing. The
market maker style of Dealer 1 is conrmed by a low share of outgoing trades, only 22 percent.
The market maker label of Dealer 2 is a bit misleading. Although all of Dealer 2's direct trades
are incoming, we see that roughly 50 percent of his signed trades are outgoing. Dealer 3 has more
outgoing than incoming trades (57 percent are outgoing), while for Dealer 4 the share of outgoing
trades is 33 percent.
Table2showsthattherearedifferencesamongourdealers. Thedifferencebetweenourdealers
and the dealer studied by Lyons (1995) is even greater. Of his total trading activity during a week
in August 1992, 66.7 percent was direct while the remaining 33.3 percent was with traditional
8Dealer 1 execute almost all his electronic broker trades by D2000-2 because there is no active trading in NOK/DEM at
EBS.
6Table 2: Dealers' transaction types. March 26 1998
The table lists different types of trades during the sample period, March 26 1998. If possible, the trades are separated into incoming or
outgoing. Almost all direct trading is done through Reuters D2000-1, and all of the direct trades are incoming trades. Electronic broker
trades are done through Reuters D2000-2 or EBS. Volume numbers are measured in DEM for Dealer 1 and in USD for Dealer 24.
Panel a Direct Electronic brokers Voice Internal
Dealer 1 incoming Incoming Outgoing broker Customer trades Total
No. of trades 93 59 48 16 50 26 292
 % total 31.8 20.2 16.4 5.5 17.1 8.9 100
Volume 341 223 196 114 246 228 1348
 % total 25.3 16.5 14.5 8.5 18.3 16.9 100
Average size 3.7 3.8 4.1 7.1 4.9 8.8
Median size 0.7 3.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 5.0
St.dev. 6.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 7.7 13.6
Min. 0.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 0.0 0.1
Max 40.0 20.0 14.0 15.0 50.0 65.0
Panel b Direct Electronic brokers Voice Internal
Dealer 2 incoming Incoming Outgoing broker Customer trades Total
No. of trades 79 359 453 57 23 21 992
 % total 8.0 36.2 45.7 5.7 2.3 2.1 100
Volume 130 659 1053 242 72 59 2214
 % total 5.9 29.8 47.6 10.9 3.2 2.7 100
Average size 1.6 1.8 2.5 4.2 3.1 2.8
Median size 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 1.0 2.5
St.dev. 1.7 1.2 1.5 2.0 4.2 3.0
Min. 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.1 0.1
Max 10.0 10.0 9.0 10.0 15.0 10.5
Panel c Direct Electronic brokers Voice Internal
Dealer 3 incoming Incoming Outgoing broker Customer trades Total
No. of trades 5 186 256 0 0 5 452
 % total 1.1 0.412 56.6 1.1 100
Volume 5 278 422 7 712
 % total 0.7 39.0 59.3 1.0 100
Average size 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.4
Median size 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
St.dev. 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.1
Min. 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.1
Max 1.5 3.0 5.0 3.0
Panel d Direct Electronic brokers Voice Internal
Dealer 4 incoming Incoming Outgoing broker Customer trades Total
No. of trades 1 278 144 0 0 4 427
 % total 0.2 65.1 33.7 1.0 100
Volume 1 423 293 2 719
 % total 0.1 58.8 40.8 0.3 100
Average size 1.5 2.0 0.5
Median size 1 2.0 0.5
St.dev. 0.8 1.2 0.5
Min. 1.0 1.0 0.1
Max 5.0 8.0 1.0
7voice brokers.9 Roughly 90 percent of his direct trades were incoming. Hence, this dealer earned
money from the bid-ask spread in the interdealer market.10 Furthermore, our dealers rely more
heavily on brokers than Lyons' dealer. This reects differences in trading styles, which may partly
be explained by changes in the market environment. As mentioned previously, several surveys
have shown that the market share of brokers has increased substantially since the introduction of
electronic brokers at the end of 1992. Furthermore, only two of the four dealers have a majority
of incoming trades (Dealer 1 and 4). Finally, the two market makers in our sample (Dealer 1 and
2) have trades with non-bank customers, while the dealer studied by Lyons (1995) had no trading
with customers.
3 Mean reversion in dealer inventories
According to conventional wisdom, inventory control is the name of the game in FX trading. Fig.
1 communicates this very clearly. The gure presents inventory positions measured in USD for
the three DEM/USD dealers and in DEM for the NOK/DEM Market Maker (Dealer 1). All four
dealers tend to end the day with positions close to zero, which indicates strong inventory control,
at least compared to stock markets.
Goinghomewithazeropositionisofcourseasignofinventorycontrol, butdoesnotsaymuch
about the intensity of intra-day inventory control. This can be investigated more thoroughly.
Inventory models suggest that dealer inventories are mean-reverting. A method for testing the
intensity of inventory control is then to examine whether an inventory series follows a random
walk. Consider a simple model of inventory time series:
DIit = a + bIit¡1 + #t, (1)
where DIit is the change in inventory from the previous trade, incoming or outgoing. Inventory
is a random walk if b = 0, while mean reversion predicts that b < 0.
Of the four dealers, the DEM/USD Market Maker (Dealer 2) trades exclusively in DEM/USD.
Forthisdealer, It corresponds tohis(ordinary) DEM/USDinventory. Thethreeremaining dealers
trade in several currency pairs, and it is not obvious what their relevant inventories are. Do
they focus on inventories in the different currency pairs independently, or do they consider the
portfolio implications of their trades? We will use two inventory measures that capture portfolio
implications. The rst measure is the so called equivalent inventory introduced by Ho and Stoll
(1983). We follow the approach suggested by Naik and Yadav (2003). The equivalent inventory
(EI
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m,t is the ordinary inventory of Dealer m in currency pair j at time t, which is simply
the inventory from trades in a particular currency pair (e.g. DEM/USD). bj,k is the slope of the











. bj,k is calculated for all currency pairs (k 6= j) using daily exchange
rates from Datastream (close) over a two-year period prior to the start of our sample. When cal-
culating covariances and variances, we measure all returns from the viewpoint of a Norwegian
FX dealer, that is, for all currency pairs we calculate returns in NOK. Similarly, all ordinary inven-
tories are calculated in NOK.11 When calculating equivalent inventories, we exclude b's that are
not signicantly different from zero at the ve percent level (see Naik and Yadav, 2001).
9In August 1992 the electronic brokers had not yet gained popularity.
10We have no information on whether the voice-broker trades were incoming or outgoing.
11We use the last available transaction price to calculate inventories in NOK.























Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri














Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri












(d) Dealer 4: USD & SEK Dealer
The evolution of dealers' inventories over the week. Inventory is measured in DEM for Dealer 1, and in USD for the other dealers. The
horizontal axis is intransaction time. Vertical lines indicate end of day.
9A second measure that to some extent captures portfolio considerations is what we call the
most risky part of inventory. Instead of calculating the inventory from e.g. DEM/USD exclu-
sively, we focus on the most risky part of the inventory. For a Norwegian DEM/USD dealer this
will be the USD inventory. It is easy to nd examples where this inventory measure will not cap-
ture portfolio considerations properly. Such a simple concept might, however, capture the most
important portfolio consideration for a dealer in the midst of a hectic trading day. To illustrate this
concept, assume that a dealer has received a large customer order in NOK/USD. Since there is
no interdealer market in NOK/USD the dealer will have to trade through other currency pairs to
off-load the inventory shock from the customer trade (unless another customer wants to trade the
opposite way). Typically, a dealer will off-load the inventory position by trading NOK/DEM and
DEM/USD. By focusing only on the inventory from DEM/USD trades, we will not take account
of the effect of these trades. Focusing on the USD inventory will capture this effect.
Table 3 presents the results on mean reversion for the three different measures of Iit for the
four dealers individually and at the desk level.12 The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at
the 1 percent level by the Phillips-Perron test (Perron, 1988) in all cases except one, in which the
null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level. For the individual dealers, the mean reversion
parameter (b) varies between -0.11 and -0.81. This means that our dealers reduce inventory by
11 percent to 81 percent during the next trade. Hence, mean reversion in inventories is very
strong. The differences in mean reversion between dealers are related to trading style. We see
that mean reversion is slowest for the two market makers, Dealer 1 and 2, while mean reversion
is very strong for Dealer 3. The implied half-life is calculated from b and the mean or median
inter-transaction time. When median inter-transaction times are used, half-lives vary between 0.7
minutes (42sec) for Dealer 3 and 17.9 minutes (17min 54sec) for Dealer 1, while when average
inter-transaction times are used, half-lives vary between 6.5 minutes (6min 30sec) for Dealer 3
and 49.3 minutes (49min 18sec) for Dealer 1. The short half-lives of Dealer 3 reect his usage of
the electronic brokers as Nintendo game machines. Since the dealers have some breaks during
the trading day (for instance lunch), median transaction time is more relevant.
For the three dealers trading in more than a single currency pair, we see that the mean rever-
sion coefcient tends to be somewhat higher for the equivalent inventory and the most risky
inventory than the ordinary inventory. Mean reversion is strong for all three inventory mea-
sures, however. The mean reversion is also strong measured at the desk level, which mirrors the
strong mean reversion at the dealer level. This indicates that the dealers do their own inventory
control. Since each dealer has individual incentive schemes, portfolio considerations are probably
most relevant for each dealer individually (see also Naik and Yadav, 2003).
Since the mean reversion coefcient tends to be slightly higher for the most risky part of
inventory than for equivalent inventories, and in particular ordinary inventories, we use
this inventory measure in the tests presented in the following sections. Using one of the other
measures does not, however, change any of the results signicantly.
Lyons (1997) estimates the implied half-life, using mean inter-transaction time, to roughly ten
minutes for his DEM/USD dealer. Using transaction data from Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
Manaster and Mann (1996) nd evidence of inventory control which is similar to our ndings.
Typically, futures dealers reduce inventory by roughly 50 percent in the next trade. Results from
stock markets are much weaker. Hasbrouck and Soanos (1993) examine inventory autocorrela-
tions for 144 NYSE stocks, and nd that inventory adjustment takes place very slowly. Madhavan
and Smidt (1993) reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for less than half of the 16 stocks in their
sample. Hence, specialist inventories exhibit slow mean reversion. They estimate the half-life to
49 days. This suggests that the inventory effect is weak. After controlling for shifts in desired
inventories, the half-life falls to 7 days. However, this estimate is also much slower than what
we observe for our dealers. Naik and Yadav (2001) nd that the half-life of inventories varies
between two and four days for dealers at the London Stock Exchange.
12Desk level is the aggregate inventory of all the four dealers. See Table 15 in the appendix for descriptive statistics.
10Table 3: Mean reversion in inventories
DIit = a + bIit¡1 + #t,
The dependent variable is the change in dealer inventories from the previous trade in Norwegian kroner (incoming or outgoing). The
explanatory variable is lagged inventory. Ordinary inventory is measured from trades only in DEM/USD (or NOK/DEM). Most risky
is the USD inventory for DEM/USD dealers and DEM inventory for the NOK/DEM dealer. Equivalent inventory is calculated for
NOK/DEM activity for Dealer 1 and for DEM/USD activity for the other dealers. Desk level refers to the inventory that includes the
aggregate inventory of the four dealers. b is the mean reversion coefcient. The test statistic is from a Phillips-Perron test (Perron, 1988)
unit root test. The Phillips-Perron test incorporates the Newey and West (1987) modication procedure with lags calculated from the sample
size (Newey-West automatic truncation lag selection). ***, ** and * indicates that the null hypothesis of one unit root can be rejected at the
1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Half-lives are calculated as mean or median inter-transaction time multiplied by ln(2)/ln(1-b).
Test Half-life Half-life
b statistic (Mean) (Median) Obs.
(a) Dealer 1 (NOK/DEM):
Ordinary inventory -0.12 ***(-4.06) 49.3 min. 17.9 min. 287
Most risky -0.18 ***(-5.16) 33.9 min. 12.3 min.
Equivalent inventory -0.15 ***(-4.61) 40.8 min. 14.8 min.
(b) Dealer 2 (DEM/USD):
Ordinary inventory -0.11 ***(-6.39) 15.8 min. 3.7 min. 987
(c) Dealer 3 (DEM/USD):
Ordinary inventory -0.75 ***(-17.11) 7.0 min. 0.7 min. 447
Most risky -0.81 ***(-17.91) 6.5 min. 0.7 min.
Equivalent inventory -0.80 ***(-17.79) 6.7 min. 0.7 min.
(d) Dealer 4 (DEM/USD):
Ordinary inventory -0.21 ***(-6.80) 19.9 min. 1.7 min. 423
Most risky -0.24 ***(-7.47) 17.5 min. 1.5 min.
Equivalent inventory -0.24 ***(-7.58) 17.2 min. 1.4 min.
(e) DEM/USD desk:
Ordinary inventory -0.10 ***(-8.76) 10.3 min. 2.9 min. 1888
Most risky -0.08 ***(-7.21) 13.3 min. 3.8 min.
Equivalent inventory -0.09 ***(-7.87) 12.0 min. 3.4 min.
(f) NOK/DEM desk:
Ordinary inventory -0.04 *(-2.64) 92.2 min. 29.3 min. 433
Most risky -0.19 ***(-6.40) 22.0 min. 7.0 min.
Equivalent inventory -0.12 ***(-4.72) 35.0 min. 11.1 min.
114 Price impact from information and inventories
This section presents the empirical models for dealer behavior and the related empirical results.
Asmentionedearlier, theoreticalmodelsdistinguishbetweenproblemsofinventorymanagement
and adverse selection. In inventory-based models, risk averse dealers adjust prices to induce
a trade in a certain direction. For instance, a dealer with a long position in USD may reduce
his ask to induce a purchase of USD by his counterpart. Information-based models consider
adverse selection problems when some dealers have private information. When a dealer receives
a trade initiative, he will revise his expectation conditioned on whether the initiative ends with a
Buy or a Sell. For both main categories of models, buyer-initiated trades will push prices up,
while seller-initiated trades will push prices down. Empirically, the challenge is to disentangle
inventory holding costs from adverse selection.
Unfortunately, there is no theoretical model based on rst principles that incorporates both
effects. The two models considered here both postulate relationships to capture information and
inventory effects. The model by Madhavan and Smidt (1991) (MS) is a natural starting point since
this is the model estimated by Lyons (1995). The trading process considered in this model is very
close to the one we nd in a typical dealer market, for example the NYSE. The FX dealer studied
by Lyons (1995) was a typical interdealer market maker. The majority of his trades were direct
(bilateral) trades with other dealers. Also, in the majority of trades he gave bid and ask prices
to other dealers on request (i.e. most trades were incoming). Hence, the trading process was
very similar to that described in the MS model. We will argue that the introduction of electronic
brokers, and heterogeneity of trading styles, makes the MS model less suitable for analyzing the
FX market.
The second model is the generalized indicator model by Huang and Stoll (1997) (HS). This
model is less structural than the MS model, but also less restrictive and may be less dependent on
the specic trading mechanism. It may also be more suitable for the informational environment
in FX markets.
4.1 The Madhavan and Smidt (1991) model (MS)
The MS model is structural in the sense that the equations are consistent with optimizing models,
have an explicit informational setting, and expectations are formed by Bayes rule. There are two
key equations. The rst, the pricing equation, is consistent with inventory models. The price set
by Dealer i (Pit) is linearly related to the dealer's conditional expectation about the true value
(mit), and current inventory measured at the beginning of the period (Iit):
Pit = mit ¡ a(Iit ¡ I¤
i ) + gDt, (3)
where I¤
i is Dealer i's desired inventory position. The inventory response effect (a) is negative to
capture quote shading. The Dt term is a direction dummy that takes the value 1 if Dealer i sells
(trades at the ask) and ¡1 if Dealer i buys (trades at the bid). One may think of gDt as covering
order processing costs, such as labor and equipment costs, and rents.




of the informed Dealer j, who has exponential
utility over terminal wealth. The demand equation enables the market maker to extract informa-
tion from Dealer j's trade using Bayes rule, hence private information effects enter through the
conditional expectation term mit in Eq. (3).
Dealer i's price schedule is a function of his conditional expectation (mit) at the time of quot-
ing. The expectation is based on a public signal (prior belief), and the noisy signal on Dealer j's
information that he can extract from Dealer j's trading behavior. Dealer i will set the price such
that it is ex post regret-free after observing the trade Qjt. Regret-free, in the sense of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), means that if the contacting dealer buys, the bid price reects the expectation
conditional on a buy.






































Dt¡1 + #it. (4)
where DPit is the price change between two incoming trades. The coefcients b1 and b3 measure
the information effect and inventory effect, respectively, while b5 measures order processing costs
and rents. The parameter f is a function of the weight on prior belief in the conditional expecta-
tion, and measures how much Dealer i emphasizes the information contained in a trade. If f is
low, i.e. low weight on prior belief, this means that the information in a trade is important when
updating expectations. The parameter q is a constant from Dealer j's demand. The regression
constant b0 is close to zero if the desired inventory I¤
i is close to zero. The model predicts that:
fb1,b3,b4g > 0; fb2,b5g < 0; jb2j > b3; b4 > jb5j.
4.2 The Huang and Stoll (1997) model (HS)
In the MS model, information costs increase with trade size. Although not obvious, this can be a
natural assumption in a typical dealer market with bilateral trades. In a limit order-based market,
however, itislessclearthattradesizewillaffectinformationcosts. Forinstance, inthesesystemsit
is Dealer i (submitter of the limit order) that determines trade size. A large market order may thus
be executed against several limit orders. The dealer submitting a limit order must still, however,
consider the possibility that another dealer (or other dealers) trade at his quotes for informational
reasons. Furthermore, on the electronic brokers, which represent the most transparent trading
channel, only the direction of trade is observed.
In the baseline HS model, it is by assumption the direction and not the size of the trade that is
important. Hence, in this model Qjt equals Dt. On electronic brokers, trade sizes are standardized
to integer millions. The two equations that give us the equivalent to Eq. (3) are the following:
Pit = Mit +
S
2
Dt + ht, (5)




Mt is the quote midpoint, S/2 is the half-spread (constant),14 ht is error due to discreteness, inven-
tory prior to trade, It, equals ¡å
t¡1
t=0Dt when trade size is equal to one, and d is the proportion of
the half-spread attributable to quote shading due to inventory control. mit is again the expected
value of currency value.15 These two equations give a pricing rule very similar to (3), with price
equal to expectation and a correction for inventory control. Desired inventory is implicitly set
equal to zero.
The expectation is modelled according to
mit = mit¡1 + l
S
2
Dt¡1 + #t, (7)
where l is the percentage of the half-spread attributable to updating beliefs conditioned on a
signal in the direction of previous trade, and #t is the serially uncorrelated public information
13We refer the reader to Madhavan and Smidt (1991) or Lyons (1995) for derivations.
14The constant spread assumption is less restrictive in FX markets than it may be perceived to be. When the European
market is open, which is the most liquid period, spreads on the electronic brokers are more or less constant up 10 millions.
15Huang and Stoll (1997) refer to mit as the unobservable fundamental value in the absence of transaction cost. We
choose to interpret it similarly to the conditional expectation in the MS model.
13shock. This equation is the equivalent of the explicit modelling of informed dealer's demand and
the Bayesian expectation formation in MS.
Using equations (5)-(7), with ¡å
t¡1





(Dt ¡ Dt¡1) + (l + d)
S
2
Dt¡1 + et, (8)
where DP is the change in price between two incoming trades. Huang and Stoll show that this
model generalizes other indicator models.
On the basis of Eq. (8), we cannot separate adverse selection and inventory costs. Huang and
Stoll suggest several ways to do this. Here we use information based on observed inventory,
which is among Huang and Stoll's suggestions (p. 1028). Since they do not have inventories they
have to use other methods. Since dealers trade with customers, on other dealers' quotes, and
have internal (intra bank) trades, observed inventory will differ from ¡å
t¡1
t=0Dt so we will not













An alternative to using the change in inventory is to use an indicator variable taking the value
+1 if the change in inventory is positive and ¡1 if the change is negative. Then the degree of bid
shading will not depend on the exact size of the inventory, but rather on the sign.
4.3 Empirical results
Table 4 presents the results for the MS model. In the regressions, we include all incoming inter-
dealer trades.16 The results of Lyons (1995) are reported for comparison. We have omitted the
overnight price changes since it is the intra day pricing decision the model is intended to ex-
plain. The model is estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982),
with the Newey and West (1987) correction of the covariance matrix for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation of unknown form.17
The model receives very little support for our data set. The + and - in parentheses in the
rst column indicate the expected sign of the coefcient. The only variables that are correctly
signed and signicant are the coefcients on Dt, and Dt¡1 (for Dealer 1). There is no evidence




increases. Similarly, there is no evidence
that dealers control inventory by adjusting their quotes.
This is in contrast to the results of Lyons, where all coefcients have the expected signs and
are signicantly different from zero. From the coefcient on Dt, the estimated baseline spread is
2.1 pips (2£ 1.04). The dealer widens his spread by 2.8 pips (2£ 0.14£ 10) per USD ten million
to protect against adverse selection. Furthermore, the dealer tends to motivate inventory decu-
mulation by shading the price by 0.8 pips (10£ 0.078) for every USD ten million of net open
position.
Apparently there is no information effect for our dealers. A possible explanation is that it
is trade direction, and not size, that is informative, as argued above. When we investigate the
coefcients closer this becomes clearer. Notice that the absolute value of the coefcients on Dt
are much larger and those on Dt¡1 are much lower for the DEM/USD dealers than for the Lyons'
dealer. From Eq. (4) we see that the coefcient on Dt is inversely related to the weight on prior
information. When we back out this weight for Dealer 1 and 2, the dealers with correct signs for
16See Table 16 in the appendix for descriptive statistics.
17We choose GMM because (i) it does not require the usual normality assumption, and because (ii) standard errors can
be adjusted to take account of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. In all of the regressions, the set of instruments
equalsthesetofregressors. Inthiscase, theparameterestimatesparallelOLSparameterestimates. Wehavealsoestimated
the model with the Hildreth-Lu procedure, as Lyons did, which is a linear estimation procedure for autoregressive error
terms, and with MA error terms (results not shown here). Whether we use GMM, Hildreth-Lu or MA does not affect any
of our results signicantly.
14Table 4: Results for the MS model, Eq. (4). Regression of DPit between incoming trades
DPit = b0 + b1Qjt + b2Iit + b3Iit¡1 + b4Dt + b5Dt¡1 + #it.
The coefcients are estimated by GMM and variable Newey-West correction. t-values in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicate signicance
at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. All coefcients are multiplied by 104. Lyons DEM/USD is from Lyons'
(1995). The dependent variable, DPit, is the change in price between two incoming trades. Qjt is signed incoming trade measured in
millions, positive for a purchase from Dealer j, and negative for a sale. Iit is inventory at the beginning of period t. Dt is an indicator
variable picking up the direction of the trade, positive for purchases (at the ask) from Dealer j and negative for sales (at the bid). The +
and - in parentheses in the rst column indicate the expected sign of the coefcient. We use all incoming trades at the D2000-1 (direct
trading), D2000-2 and EBS (indirect trading). Observations where the inter-transaction time is larger than 45 minutes have been deleted for
Dealer 2, 3 and 4.
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Dealer 1 Dealer 2 Dealer 3 Dealer 4 Lyons
Constant 1.28 0.01 0.17 0.08 -0.13
(1.15) (0.04) (0.32) (0.17) (-0.99)
Trade (+) 0.14 -0.19 -2.24 0.08 0.14 ¡
Qjt
¢
(0.52) (-0.77) **(-2.26) (0.20) ***(3.03)
Inventory (-) -0.11 -0.02 1.42 0.16 -0.10
(It) (-0.78) (-0.13) **(2.37) (0.42) ***(-3.56)
Inventory (+) -0.01 0.06 -0.63 -0.37 0.08
(It¡1) (-0.09) (0.47) (-0.80) (-0.81) ***(2.95)
Direction (+) 6.54 1.77 4.25 2.17 1.04
(Dt) ***(4.91) ***(3.12) ***(2.76) **(2.28) ***(4.86)
Direction (-) -2.95 -0.40 0.06 0.25 -0.92
(Dt¡1) *(-1.90) (-1.20) (0.05) (0.26) ***(-6.28)
Adj. R2 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.22
Observations 144 430 169 263 838
lagged direction, we get weights for trade information equal to 0.8 and 0.55 respectively. This
may suggest that the direction variables pick up an information effect. We therefore proceed with
estimation of the HS indicator model in Eq. (8). The results are presented in Table 5.
In contrast to the results for the MS model, we see that both coefcients are signicantly differ-
ent from zero and have the expected signs. The implied constant effective spread for DEM/USD
ranges from 2.9 pips (Dealer 2) to 4.9 pips (Dealer 3) (2£1.45 and 2£2.45). Pooling all incoming
trades, the estimated effective spread is 3.2 pips. By way of comparison, Goodhart, Love, Payne,
and Rime (2002) nd that the average difference between best bid and ask quotes on D2000-2 was
2.8 pips in 1997. Given that we estimate effective and not quoted spread, 3.2 pips is very close to
where the market was trading at the time.
The proportion of the effective spread that is explained by adverse selection or inventory hold-
ing costs is remarkably similar for the three DEM/USD dealers. It ranges from 76 percent (Dealer
2) to 82 percent (Dealer 4). Using all incoming trades, we nd that 78 percent of the effective
spread is explained by adverse selection or inventory holding costs. Compared to stock markets,
this number is high. For instance, Huang and Stoll (1997), using exactly the same regression, nd
that only 11 percent of the spread is explained by adverse selection or inventory holding costs for
stocks traded at NYSE. For FX markets, however, this number is reasonable. Payne (2003) nds
that 60 percent of the spread in DEM/USD can be explained by adverse selection using D2000-2
data.
For NOK/DEM we nd a half-spread of roughly 7 pips, which corresponds to an effective
spread of 14 pips. By way of comparison, the average quoted spread in direct trades for Dealer
1 was 15 pips. This is equivalent to a basis point spread of 0.034 percent. As expected, the basis
point spread is higher than that for DEM/USD, which is approximately half the size (0.017 per-
cent). Of the entire spread of 14 pips, roughly 50 percent can be attributed to adverse selection
or inventory holding costs. The fact that a lower share is attributable to information or inventory,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16market is less competitive,18 and (ii) the fact that the xed costs are split over fewer trades.
Next, we try to determine how much of the spread that is explained by adverse selection, and
how much that is explained by inventory holding costs. Table 6 shows the regression results for
equation (9).19 We nd no evidence of inventory holding costs. The spread can thus be separated
into two parts: order processing costs/rents and adverse selection costs. The information compo-
nent for the NOK/DEM Market Maker (Dealer 1) is approximately 50 percent. For the DEM/USD
dealers we see that for Dealer 2 the information part is 72 percent of the spread. The gures for
Dealer 3 and 4 are larger than 1 but not signicantly different from e.g. 0.8.
Table 6: Results for the indicator model, Eq. (9). Regression of DPit between incoming trades.












The coefcients are estimated by GMM and variable Newey-West correction. t-values in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicate signicance
at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. (S/2) is multiplied by 104. Inventory is divided by the median trade size in
incoming inter-dealer trades. The dependent variable is DPit, and is the change in price between two incoming trades. We use all incoming
trades at the D2000-1, D2000-2 and EBS. Adj. R2 is from the same regression including a constant. Observations where the inter-transaction
time is larger than 45 minutes have been deleted for Dealer 2, Dealer 3 and Dealer 4.
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Dealer 1 Dealer 2 Dealer 3 Dealer 4 Lyons
Half-spread 6.56 1.46 1.84 2.06 1.43
(S/2) ***(5.28) ***(3.78) **(2.17) ***(4.79) ***(11.55)
Information 0.49 0.72 1.24 1.00 0.43
(l) **(2.34) ***(3.28) **(2.53) **(2.28) ***(4.66)
Inventory 0.00 0.00 -0.43 -0.13 0.21
(d) (0.11) (-0.40) (-1.06) (-0.63) ***(3.31)
Adj. R2 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.20
Obs. 144 430 169 263 838
Finally, we consider whether there are any differences in order processing costs or adverse
selection costs in direct and indirect trades, and if inter-transaction time matters. These tests are
implemented with indicator variables in the HS model. The results are summarized in Table 7.
We nd no signicant differences between direct and indirect trades, in contrast to Reiss and
Werner (2002) who nd that adverse selection is stronger in the direct market at the London Stock
Exchange. As regards intertransaction time, Lyons (1996) nds that trades are informative when
intertransaction time is high, but not when the intertransaction time is short (less than a minute).
We dene short inter-transaction time as less than a minute for DEM/USD and less than ve
minutes for NOK/DEM. It turns out that the effective spread is larger when inter-transaction
time is long, while the proportion of the spread that can be attributed to private information (or
inventory holding costs) is similar whether the inter-transaction time is long or short. This means
that private information is more informative when inter-transaction time is long. This nding can
be consistent with the model by Admati and Peiderer (1988) where order ow is less informative
when trading intensity is high due to bunching of discretionary liquidity trades.
Further conrmation of the information effect from order ow to price can be established
by means of cointegration. Cointegration is predicted in several microstructure models with
Bayesian learning, e.g. Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985) and Back (1992). To see this,
we abstract from inventory considerations, as in the models mentioned. At time t the dealer give
quotes equal to his conditional expectation, which is a weighted average of his prior and the cur-
rent order ow (signal). This conditional expectation will then become the prior belief at time
18Dealer 1 has a market share of about 40 percent.
19We also run a similar regression with a dummy variable instead of changes in inventory. The dummy takes the value
+1 if (¡DI) is positive and ¡1 if (¡DI) is negative. In this case, the degree of quote shading would not depend on the
size of inventory changes. The results are similar to those presented in Table 6.
17Table 7: Results for the indicator model with different dummies for different trading systems and
different inter-transaction time ,respectively
The regressions are estimated by GMM and variable Newey-West correction. The HS model is estimated with indicator variables for (1)
direct or indirect trading on electronic brokers and (2) short or long inter-transaction time. Inter-transaction time is short when the time
between two incoming orders are less than one minute for DEM/USD, and less than ve minutes for NOK/DEM. Spread is the xed
spread estimated by the model, while Info is the share of the spread that is explained by private information (or inventory costs, however,
other regressions suggest that inventory has no effect on dealers own prices). We report the F-value and the corresponding p-value from
the Wald test that the coefcients are similar. If the coefcients are signicantly different, (<) (or >) indicates whether e.g. spread is larger
(smaller) when inter-transaction time is long. We use all incoming trades at the D2000-1 (direct trading), D2000-2 and EBS (indirect trading).
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Spread Info Spread Info
Direct=Electronic broker 0.05 0.82 0.17 0.04
p-value 0.81 0.37 0.68 0.84
Short=Long intertrans. time (<) 3.85 0.15 (<) 5.20 0.38
p-value 0.05 0.69 0.02 0.54
t + 1. So when he gives quotes, order ows from all previous periods are part of his prior belief,
while the order ow in the current period will be his current signal.
In Table 8 we report results from the Johansen procedure. Since the most important source of
order ow information is the direction indicator on electronic brokers we use the cumulative ow
of directions.
Table 8: Cointegration of price and cumulative order ow
The coefcients are estimated using the Johansen procedure. Cumulative ow is created using the direction of all the trades (D2000-1,
D2000-2 and EBS). Flow coeff. reports the coefcient on cumulative ow in the cointegrating vector, and is multiplied by 104. ECM
coeff. is the error-correction coefcient in the VeqM. The last line reports the trace statistic for unique cointegrating vector, and ***, ** and
* indicate signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. The VAR includes one lag, which is determined using
the Aikake and Schwartz information criterion. Removing the lag does not change any of the results. The cointegrating vector includes a
constant and a trend in the NOK/DEM equation, and a constant in the DEM/USD equation.
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Flow coeff. 4.41 1.01
(3.48) (7.16)
ECM coeff -0.09 -0.01
(-3.87) (-2.17)
Half-life (min.) 19.53 29.20
Unique coint vector *22.76 ***22.36
Observations 321 2079
The ow is aggregated over all the trades that our dealers participate in on the electronic trad-
ing systems. The sign of a trade is given by the action of the initiator, irrespective of whether it
was one of our dealers or a counterparty who initiated the trade. The ow coefcients are signi-
cant and have the expected sign. A larger positive cumulative ow of USD purchases appreciates
the USD, i.e. depreciates the DEM. The coefcient is 4.41 for NOK/DEM and 1.01 for DEM/USD,
meaning that an additional purchase of DEM with NOK will increase the NOK price of DEM by
approximately 4.4 pips. We can compare this with the results from the HS regressions (Table 5,
all dealers). In the HS analysis we found a xed half spreads of 7.14 and 1.6 pips, and informa-
tion shares of 0.49 and 0.78 for NOK/DEM and DEM/USD respectively. The coefcients from
the HS analysis that are comparable with the cointegration coefcients are 3.57 and 1.28. The
cointegration coefcients on ow are very close to this, only slightly lower for DEM/USD and
slightly higher for NOK/DEM. The higher effect from the HS analysis for DEM/USD may reect
that we use the coefcient for inventory and information combined in Table 5. If the information
share from Table 6 for the DEM/USD Market Maker is used the comparable coefcient is 1.05.
The slightly lower effect for NOK/DEM may reect that we pick up effects from order ows that
18our dealers do not take part in, and that are correlated with this ow. Flows in the NOK/DEM
market are more likely to be correlated than in the DEM/USD market due to the higher concentra-
tion. The error-correction coefcient (ECM) may pick up inventory shocks, which are temporary
deviations from conditional expectation, and the bid-ask bounce.
Is cointegration a meaningful concept in intra-day analysis? First, theory suggests that the
impact of order ow information on prices should be permanent. Second, as we see from Table
8, the half-lives of deviations from the cointegrating equation are quite short, 20 and 30 minutes
for NOK/DEM and DEM/USD respectively, which implies that we see far more returns to equi-
librium in our sample than one usually does in e.g. cointegration analysis on Purchasing Power
Parity. Finally, cointegration between cumulative ow and the exchange rate is also documented
in Killeen, Lyons, and Moore (2001) and Rime (2001).
Finally, weturntoanalyzing thedirect trades alone. Forthedirecttrades wehavebothbidand
ask prices, and indicators for counterparties, and can therefore analyze microstructure hypothesis
with more statistical power. In Table 9 we regress the quoted spread variables that microstruc-
ture theories predict should inuence the spread. Easley and O'Hara (1987) suggest that spreads
should widen with size to deter informed dealers, while some inventory models suggest that
spreads should widen with inventory to cover the risk in taking on extra inventory. First, the
constant parts of the spreads are 1.7 and 910 pips for DEM/USD and NOK/DEM respectively.
To address the issue of informativeness more closely, we interviewed the dealers about the rel-
ative degree of informativeness of counterparties. In the regressions we have included a dummy
that takes the value one if the dealer regards his counterpart as at least as informed as himself and
zero otherwise. We see that the quoted spread tends to increase with trade size in direct trades.
There is also some evidence that Dealer 1 makes an extra adjustment in trades with better in-
formed dealers. For the DEM/USD dealer, however, we nd no evidence of any extra adjustment
when trading with better informed dealers. The lack of spread adjustment when trading with
better informed banks may be due to the norms of the market. Furthermore, there is no inventory
impact for the DEM/USD market maker (Dealer 2), while the NOK/DEM market maker (Dealer
1) adjusts the width of his spread to account for his inventory. Dealer 1 is in a less liquid market,
and it therefore makes sense to adjust spreads for inventory.
Table 9: Regression of observed spread from D2000-1 trades on absolute quantity traded and
absolute inventory
The coefcients are estimated by ordinary least square. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1 percent,
5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. Abs(Qjt) is the trade (absolute) quantity measured in millions. Abs(Iit) is the absolute value
of inventory before quoting. Informed is a dummy that takes the value one if the dealer regards his counterpart as at least as informed as
himself. The dependent variable is the observed spread in pips (multiplied by 104).
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Dealer 1 Dealer 2
Constant 9.180 9.597 1.739 1.706
***(10.32) ***(9.73) ***(16.02) ***(14.46)
Informed -0.979 0.115
(dummy djt) (-0.57) (0.43)
Abs. trade 1.504 1.153 0.139 0.179
(jQjtj) ***(11.50) ***(5.06) ***(3.95) ***(2.89)




Abs. inventory 0.182 0.163 0.002 -0.000
(jIitj) **(2.32) **(2.08) (0.13) (-0.01)
Adj. R2 0.72 0.72 0.20 0.17
Observations 61 61 62 62
In the MS and HS analysis we found no trace of inventory control through prices. The inven-
tory impact on quotes for the NOK/DEM Market Maker in Table 9 may, however, be result of
19quote shading. If he is long (wish to induce a sale, trade at the ask) he can lower his bid to make
that side unattractive. In Table 10 we report the result of a probit-regression on direct trades. If
there is quote shading then one would expect that trading at the ask is more likely when inven-
tory prior to the current trade is positive, and at the bid if inventory was negative. In Table 10 we
let the dependent variable equal 1 if there is trading at the ask and 0 if there is trading at the bid.
We see that inventory from the trade prior to this has no impact in this regression, in contrast to
quote shading and in line with our previous results.
Table 10: Probit-regression of quote shading in incoming direct trades
Probit regression of the choice of bid or ask quote. Transactions at the ask are 1, while transactions at the bid are 0. The explanatory variable
is inventory prior to trading. z-values are in parentheses, and * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level. R2 is McFadden's analog to
ordinary R2 measures.
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Dealer 1 Dealer 2
Constant -0.311 -0.045
*(-1.96) (-0.28)
Inventory (+) -0.016 0.048
(Iit) (-1.08) (1.38)
McFadden's R2 0.01 0.02
Observations 67 62
5 Inventory control and prots
Section 3 showed evidence of strong mean reversion in dealer inventories, while the previous
section showed that inventory is not controlled through the dealers' own prices as suggested by
inventory models. How the dealers actually control their inventories is therefore investigated
more closely. Subsection 5.1 presents some general observations on how our dealers control their
inventories, while subsection 5.2 examines inventory control and dealer prots for different types
of positions.
5.1 Some general observations on inventory control
Table 11 shows how the dealers use electronic brokers, voice brokers and internal trades to con-
trol their inventory positions. Trades that increase the absolute size of their inventory are accu-
mulating, while trades that decrease the absolute size of their inventory are decumulating. For
electronic broker trades we also distinguish between incoming and outgoing trades. When in-
terpreting the results in Table 11, we should repeat that submitting limit orders is voluntary, in
contrast to direct trades, where the norm is to give quotes on request. Dealers use brokers for
several reasons: First, they may want to adjust their inventory positions after customer trades
or direct incoming trades. Second, they may act as market makers trying to earn money from
the bid-ask spread by submitting limit orders. Finally, they may use the electronic brokers for
speculative purposes (i.e. to establish a position).
From Table 11 we see that there is no systematic pattern for the two market makers (Deal-
ers 1 and 2). Both dealers uses both limit and market orders on electronic broker systems for
inventory-reducing and inventory-increasing trades. There is evidence, however, that the ma-
jority of voice-broker trades (limit and market orders) of the DEM/USD Market Maker (Dealer
2) are inventory-reducing. For Dealer 3 and 4 a systematic pattern arises. Typically, most in-
coming trades (limit orders) on the electronic broker systems are inventory-reducing, while most
outgoing trades (market orders) are inventory-increasing. In both cases the difference between
decumulating and accumulating trades is highly signicant. A difference between Dealer 3 and 4
is that the majority of Dealer 4's trades are incoming (66 percent of trades are incoming, while 42
20Table 11: Accumulating and decumulating trades
Trades that increase the absolute size of the inventory are accumulating, while trades that decrease the absolute size of the inventory are
decumulating. Voice-broker trades or internal trades are not signed. P-values are based on the binomial distribution.
Electronic broker Voice- Internal
Incoming Outgoing broker trades
Dealer 1:
Decumulating trades 24 22 9 12
Accumulating trades 35 26 7 8
Test (p-value) 0.19 0.67 0.80 0.50
Dealer 2:
Decumulating trades 192 211 36 9
Accumulating trades 166 242 21 10
Test (p-value) 0.19 0.16 0.06 1.00
Dealer 3:
Decumulating trades 138 95 0 4
Accumulating trades 48 160 0 1
Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.38
Dealer 4:
Decumulating trades 188 50 0 3
Accumulating trades 90 93 0 1
Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.63
percent of Dealer 3's trades are incoming). We nd no systematic pattern for the internal trades.
The fact that there are few observations could, however, be part of the explanation.
Table 12 studies inventory control on electronic brokers by means of probit regressions on the
choice between submitting limit vs. market orders. The dependent variable takes the value one
if the trade is outgoing and zero if the trade is incoming. The explanatory variables are absolute
trade size, absolute inventory (at the beginning of the period) and absolute inventory squared.
Table 12: Probit regression of incoming/outgoing trade
Probit regression of incoming/outgoing trade decision. Incoming trades are coded 0, while outgoing trades are coded 1. R2 is McFadden's
analog to ordinary R2 measures.
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Dealer 1 Dealer 2 Dealer 3 Dealer 4
Constant -0.295 -0.183 0.462 -0.609
(-1.17) *(-1.69) ***(2.70) ***(-3.42)
Absolute trade size 0.014 0.153 0.189 0.347 ¡¯ ¯Qjt
¯ ¯¢
(0.34) ***(4.71) **(2.11) ***(5.17)
Absolute inventory 0.020 -0.014 -0.993 -0.271
(jIitj) (0.58) (-0.44) ***(-5.29) ***(-2.85)




(-0.51) (0.97) ***(3.17) *(1.93)
McFadden's R2 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.08
Observations 109 812 441 426
DEM/USDdealerstendtotradeoutgoingwhentradesizeislarge. Whenhittingotherdealers'
limit orders (outgoing trade), the dealer may have several counterparts. Execution is immediate,
and we record this as a single order. On the other hand, when the dealer submits a limit order
(incoming trade) the dealer may not be hit by another dealer for the entire order.20 This difference
20If the entire order is not fullled, the dealer may choose to withdraw the rest of his limit order.
21may explain the signicant coefcient on absolute trade size. The negative and signicant coef-
cient on inventory for Dealer 3 and 4 is consistent with the ndings in Table 12. These dealers
control their inventory by submitting limit orders. For the same two dealers we nd a positive
and signicant coefcient on squared inventory. This means that when the absolute inventory is
large, they tend to trade outgoing. Mean reversion of inventories is also strongest for these two
dealers. For the NOK/DEM Market Maker (Dealer 1) we nd no signicant coefcients.
5.2 Different types of positions and inventory control
In this subsection we distinguish between different types of trades. We group trades according to
whether the dealer has a active or passive role in the trade. Liquidity provision in direct trades or
to customers are passive trades because the dealer can only inuence the prices he quotes, while
all trades on brokers are active trades because he can also decide on the timing.21 This enables
us to measure prot from different types of trades and to say more about inventory control con-
ditional on the type of trade. It is also of interest just to test whether these dealers are making
money. Dealers that consistently lose money are less likely to be representative of the market.
In the literature, different methods are suggested for measuring protability (e.g. Hasbrouck and
Soanos, 1993; Lyons, 1997; Harris and Schultz, 1998). All the different alternatives have, how-
ever, shortcomings when applied to our dealers.
To identify different positions, we focus on the currency pair in which the specic dealer does
most of his trading. Direct incoming trades (i.e. direct liquidity-providing trades) and customer
trades can easily be identied by our data. Using this information, prots from traditional market
making to other dealers and customers can be calculated by using a benchmark. As a benchmark
we use the rst trade after the D2000-1 trade or customer trade which is not a D2000-1 or a cus-
tomer trade. By using this trade as a benchmark, the inter-transaction time between the bench-
mark trade and the direct trade or customer trade will usually be short. The suggested benchmark
will also tell us something about how dealers control their inventories after direct trades or cus-
tomer trades. The benchmark trade will usually be inventory-reducing and can be incoming or
outgoing. We did not construct a neutral benchmark as an average between bid and ask prices
for the following two reasons: First, it is difcult to measure bid-ask spread at a single point in
time, and second, and more important, is that the dealers probably decide how to control their
inventory after a direct trade or customer trade when giving quotes.
In addition to direct trades and customer trades, dealers may establish positions through other
types of trades. We call these trades accumulating active trades. These trades can be speculative,
but need not be so. For instance, dealers may act as market makers by submitting limit orders to
brokers. If the majority of these trades are outgoing it is, however, more likely that the trades are
speculative. We identify accumulating active position taking as accumulating trades if they are
not immediately followed by direct trades or customer trades of the opposite sign. The last condi-
tion was included since we sometimes see a position buildup prior to these trades (front-running).
We use the rst non-accumulating trade as a benchmark. By using the rst non-accumulating
trade our prot measure will, to some extent, take into account the time horizon of the position.
Table 13 presents the results for the direct trades and customer trades, while Table 14 shows
the results for the accumulating active trades. Since the DEM/USD Market Maker (Dealer 2)
trades only in DEM/USD, we get an indication of how well our separation of different types of
trades works by comparing estimated and actual prot. By adding the estimated prots in the
two tables, our estimated total prot is DEM 75,545. This is quite close to the actual prot of
DEM 68,206. The actual (overall) prots for the remaining three dealers are DEM 229,471 (Dealer
1), DEM 54,482 (Dealer 3), and DEM 97,242 (Dealer 4). For comparison, total estimated prots
for their most active currency pair are DEM 133,615 for Dealer 1 (68.6 percent of overall trading
volume identied), DEM 40,600 for Dealer 3 (91.6 percent of total trading volume identied), and
21Placing a limit order with a broker would also be liquidity provision. The dealer is however more active in this trade
since he can choose time and which side of the market.
22DEM 30,000 for Dealer 4 (65 percent of overall trading volume identied). Since their share of
customer trades is larger for the other currency pairs in which these dealers trade, and because
customer trades on average are more protable than other types of trades, we think our estimates
are reasonable. It should also be noted that all of the dealers earn money on average.
Table 13: Direct incoming trades and customer trades. Prot and inventory
t-values are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. To estimate
prots from interdealer market making and customer trades, we use the next trade as a benchmark (not direct incoming trade or customer
trades). No. of trades measures the number of trades where we can calculate prot (that is, where we have a benchmark).
NOK/DEM (Dealer 1) DEM/USD (Dealer 2)
Direct trades: Direct Customer Direct Customer
Average size (per trade) 3.7 4.9 1.6 3.1
Median size (per trade) 0.6 3.0 1.0 1.0
Average prot (per million) 4.5 22.0 1.4 2.0
***(3.18) ***(31.15) ***(2.91) (1.00)
Median prot (per million) 5.0 20.0 1.0 2.0
% outgoing benchmark 52.9 38.0 42.3 40.0
No. of trades 87 49 78 20
Estimated prot (in DEM) 22,584 92,686 11,043 12,046
% of volume identied positions 43.3 31.7 11.1 6.5
The NOK/DEM Market Maker (Dealer 1) makes money on both direct incoming trades and
customer trades. On average, he earns 4.5 pip per million on the direct incoming trades. This
number is very close to what we would predict from the results in section 4. His customer trades
are very protable. Measured per million he earns 22 pip on average, which is roughly ve times
more than the average for the direct trades. We also note that a larger share of the benchmark
trades are outgoing when he trades direct than when he trades with a customer. The estimated
prots document that customer trades are highly protable. Of his total activity in NOK/DEM,
43.3 percent is related to incoming direct trades, while 31.7 percent is related to customer trades.
The DEM/USD Market Maker (Dealer 2) earns, on average, 1.4 pip per million in direct incoming
trades. The median is 1 pip. This number is high compared with our results in section 4, although
the majority of benchmark trades are incoming. The average prot on his customer trades is
larger, 2 pip per million. Of the total positions of this dealer, 11.1 percent is related to incoming
direct trades, while 6.5 percent is related to customer trades.
InTable14weseethatalldealers makesignicant positiveprotsontheiraccumulating active
trades. Dealer 1 earns on average 4.9 pip per million on his accumulating active trades. The size of
a typical position is DEM 5 million. He makes positive prots in 76 percent of the positions. The
majority of the accumulating active trades are incoming. The same is true of the benchmarks. Of
his overall activity we see that 25 percent is related to accumulating active positions. Total prots
from these positions in NOK/DEM is DEM 18,345, which is small compared with his prots from
direct incoming trades and in particular customer trades.
For the DEM/USD dealers the typical size of a position is from USD one million to USD
three million. On average they earn roughly one pip per million. The t-values are all signicantly
different from zero. We also see that the dealers make money in signicantly more than 50 percent
of the positions. Taking all positions with positive or negative prots, Dealer 2 is making positive
prots in 67 percent of the cases. Dealer 4 earns money in 80 percent of the positions, while Dealer
3 earns money in 84 percent of the positions. Consistent with results in Table 11 we see that most
of the accumulating active trades of Dealer 3 are outgoing, while the majority of the decumulating
trades are incoming. For Dealer 4 we see that roughly 50 percent of the accumulating active trades
are outgoing, while the majority of decumulating trades are incoming.
To sum up, we see that the two market makers execute all three types of trades in their
most important currency pair (direct incoming trades, customer trades and accumulating active
trades). All three types of activities are protable. Most protable are, however, customer trades.
23Table 14: Accumulating active trades. Prot and inventory
t-values are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. A trade is
accumulating if the absolute inventory position in USD (DEM/USD dealers) or DEM (NOK/DEM dealer) increases. An accumulating
active position is a sequence of trades that accumulate inventory and that are not immediately followed by a direct trade or customer trade.
To estimate prots, we use the rst non-accumulating trade as benchmark (not a D2000-1 or a customer trade). No. of accumulating active
positions measures the number of sequences with accumulating active trades. Estimated prots is the sum of prots from all accumulating
active trades.
NOK/DEM DEM/USD
Dealer 1 Dealer 2 Dealer 3 Dealer 4
Average size (per position) 6.59 3.35 1.81 2.57
Median size (per position) 5.00 3.00 1.00 2.00
Average prot (per million) 4.9 0.94 1.1 1.22
t-value ***(2.89) **(2.45) ***(8.44) **(2.09)
Median prot (per million) 5.0 1.0 1.0 1.5
% positive prots 76.0 66.8 83.9 79.9
p-value ***(0.00) ***(0.00) ***(0.00) ***(0.00)
% outgoing accumulating active trade 34.2 60.2 76.6 50.5
% outgoing benchmark trade 40.0 59.6 43.3 25.3
t-value (difference) (-0.42) (0.14) ***(7.20) ***(5.27)
No. of accumulating active positions 30 276 197 139
Estimated prots (in DEM) 18,345 52,456 40,600 30,000
% of volume identied positions 25.0 82.5 98.7 100
Almost all positions of Dealer 3 and 4 in their most important currency pair can be characterized
as accumulating active positions. Moreover, their trading has a lot in common with the future
dealers studied in Manaster and Mann (1996). Similar to the futures dealers, the inventories of
Dealer 3 and 4 show strong mean reversion, while there is no sign of quote shading in incoming
trades. Consistent with the ndings of Manaster and Mann (1996), their execution price will be
better when the absolute value of their inventory is high rather than low as predicted by inven-
tory models. The reason is that they typically trade outgoing when increasing the absolute value
of their inventories, while they trade incoming when reducing the absolute value of their inven-
tories. As noted by Manaster and Mann (1996) with regard to futures dealers, the FX dealers are
not merely passive order llers, but are prot-seeking individuals with heterogeneous levels of
information and/or trading skills.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the behavior of four interbank spot foreign exchange dealers using a detailed
data set for the week March 26 1998, with transaction prices, trading quantities, dealer invento-
ries, exact timing, and information regarding the trading system used for the transactions. The
four dealers trade in different exchange rates and have different trading styles. Using our data,
we study whether dealers set prices to protect against private information and how they control
inventory to adjust their risk exposure.
In a widely cited paper, Lyons (1995), using data from 1992, nds support for both information
and inventory effects in the pricing of an FX dealer. Using a version of the Madhavan and Smidt
model, Lyons nds, consistent with the model predictions, that the dealer increase his spread with
trade size to protect against private information, and adjusts the midpoint in the spread (quote
shading) to induce trade in a preferred direction to adjust inventory. Using the same model as
Lyons for our dealers, we nd no support for such information or inventory effects. Our results
suggestthattheMadhavanandSmidtmodelmaynotbeasapplicabletoforeignexchangetrading
as rst believed because of differences in trading styles among the dealers. A likely explanation
is the change in the trading environment caused by the introduction of electronic brokers.
24Using an indicator model (the Huang and Stoll model), we show that private information is
indeed important in the FX market. For DEM/USD, we nd that private information is respon-
sible for as much as 80 percent of the effective spread in the interdealer market. For NOK/DEM,
roughly 50 percent of the effective spread is explained by private information. Order ow as a
carrier of information since cointegration analysis show that order ow has a permanent effect on
prices.
Interestingly, we nd strong evidence of mean reversion with half-lives of dealer inventories
thatrangefromlessthanaminutetofteenminutes. Littleofthisis, however, manifestedthrough
dealers' own prices as predicted by the inventory models.
We show how the dealers control their inventories and how different types of positions con-
tribute to their overall protability. In doing this we distinguish between three types of trades. In
general, dealers use the electronic brokers to unwind their positions using both limit and market
orders. We nd that customer trades are highly protable. This business is particularly important
for the NOK/DEM Market Maker in our sample. However, the dealers also earn money from
their direct incoming trades and from actively establishing positions through electronic brokers.
Active position taking seems to represent an important share of the trading for three of the deal-
ers. The dealers provide liquidity by submitting limit orders on electronic broker systems, and
may thus earn money from the bid-ask spread. Or they submit market orders to establish specu-
lative positions. Hence, the dealers do not only use the interdealer market to off-load unwanted
positions from their customer business. For two of the dealers, we nd that the share of outgo-
ing trades is higher when they establish a position than when they unwind the same position.
This nding may suggests that these dealers submit market orders when they have information.
This behavior also means that the dealers increase their absolute inventory position at worse
prices (trade outgoing) than when they reduce their absolute inventory position (trade incom-
ing). Similar evidence can be found in Manaster and Mann (1996) for futures dealers. Manaster
and Mann (1996) conclude that dealers may have different levels of private information and/or
trading skills. Hence, the effect of inventory on price need not be as predicted by standard market
microstructure models where the dealer/market maker is assumed to have no private informa-
tion when setting prices, while the initiator of the trade may have private information.
As mentioned, electronic brokering has become the dominant tool for interdealer trading since
its introduction at the end of 1992. Interestingly, we do not nd evidence that the price impact
from direct trades is different from the price impact of electronic broker trades in contrast with the
results of Reiss and Werner (2002) for the London Stock Exchange. This may suggest that (at least
during theweekwestudy)electronic brokers can provide enough liquidity. Thisisalsosupported
by the fact that the market share of electronic brokers has continued to rise also after 1998 and has
now (according to practitioners) a market share of roughly 85 percent of all interdealer trading.
What can we learn about FX trading from these four dealers? They are not dealers in one of
the large US banks. However, the bank in question has a long history of FX trading and have
been among top 15 banks in DEM/USD over a long period. In NOK/DEM they are probably
the largest bank. The introduction of electronic brokers has also made tight spreads available to
more than just the key dealers in the largest banks, thus making the terms between dealers in
the market more equal. Furthermore, their trading strategy seems quite successful. The fact that
we document differences in trading strategy, roughly the older market makers and the young
electronic broker dealers, also means that we cover different aspects of FX trading even if the
dealers are from the same bank.
Still, there is a great demand for more knowledge about the microstructure of the FX market
due to the lack of dealer-specic trading data and inventories. This is especially true for the new
trading environment resulting from the introduction of electronic broker systems. In this respect,
this study lls a gap in the literature.
25A Descriptive statistics
Table 15: Descriptive statistics on inventories
Ordinary inventory is measured from only trades in DEM/USD (or NOK/DEM). Most risky is USD inventory for DEM/USD dealers and
DEM inventory for the NOK/DEM dealer. Desk level refers to the inventory at the desk level, that is, it includes the aggregate inventory
of the four dealers.
Ordinary Most Equiv.
Inventory risky Inventory Dt (min.)
Average 27.65 5.32 1.38 8.11
Dealer 1 Median 34.57 7.96 -2.79 2.95
NOK/DEM Max 286.81 212.39 247.61 80.20
Min. -149.34 -167.79 -175.39 0.00
Std.dev. 68.77 56.46 62.29 11.71
Average 2.42 2.38
Dealer 2 Median 1.38 0.55
DEM/USD Max 156.59 62.57
Min. -164.82 0.00
Std.dev. 45.64 5.32
Average 3.26 1.15 1.52 5.66
Dealer 3 Median 0 0 0.19 0.58
DEM/USD Max 30.45 30.24 30.43 64.95
Min. -22.77 -22.84 -22.8 0.00
Std.dev. 10.84 10.42 10.49 11.49
Average -29.44 -4.18 -2.65 5.40
Dealer 4 Median -28.94 -5.81 -3.73 0.45
DEM/USD Max 32.08 62.77 64.35 371.05
Min. -111.83 -81.38 -70.13 0.00
Std.dev. 23.18 21.43 21.26 28.12
Average 0.48 -11.54 -11.44 1.46
Desk level Median -3.56 -13.98 -13.02 0.42
DEM/USD Max 118.23 108.64 117.44 81.48
Min. -165.35 -188.52 -186.07 0.00
Std.dev. 40.24 46.39 44.54 3.70
Average 91.03 -10.42 40.46 5.52
Desk level Median 107.68 -7.24 47.52 1.75
NOK/DEM Max 414.36 282.89 300.64 80.20
Min. -152.33 -188.49 -137.82 0.00
Std.dev. 98.97 63.84 63.81 9.37
26Table 16: Descriptive statistics on regression variables: Sample moments for incoming trades
DPit is the change in price between two incoming trades in pips (fourth decimal), and Abs(DPit) is the absolute value of this change. Qjt is
the quantity transacted at Dealer i's quoted prices measured in millions (USD or DEM), positive for a purchase from Dealer j, and negative
for a sale. Abs(Qjt) is the absolute value of Qjt. Iit is inventory at the end of period t, and Abs(Iit) is the absolute value of the inventory. Dt
is inter-transaction time between two incoming trades in minutes. Sample: One week in March 1998.
DPit Abs(DPit) Qjt Abs(Qjt) Iit Abs(Iit) Dt
Mean 0.4 12.1 -0.72 3.66 0.37 8.57 15.69
Dealer 1 Median 0.0 10.0 -0.27 2.00 1.76 5.26 7.64
NOK/ Max. 50.0 55.0 20.00 40.00 41.13 41.13 102.60
DEM Min. -55.0 0.0 -40.00 0.02 -35.17 0.15 0.02
Std. Dev. 16.8 11.7 6.22 5.08 12.11 8.53 20.03
Mean 0.1 4.5 0.25 1.80 0.20 4.18 5.22
Dealer 2 Median 0.0 3.0 1.00 1.00 0.18 3.55 2.33
DEM/ Max. 46.0 82.0 10.00 10.00 17.65 17.65 62.57
USD Min. -82.0 0.0 -5.00 0.25 -16.01 0.02 0.00
Std.dev. 7.7 6.3 2.22 1.32 5.54 3.64 8.14
Mean -0.3 6.9 0.18 1.48 0.24 1.30 13.46
Dealer 3 Median 0.0 4.0 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 4.88
DEM/ Max. 51.0 51.0 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 69.75
USD Min. -50.0 0.0 -3.00 0.50 -3.00 0.00 0.02
Std.dev. 11.0 8.6 1.64 0.71 1.64 1.02 17.47
Mean -0.1 4.5 -0.20 1.53 -0.71 2.41 7.34
Dealer 4 Median -1.0 2.0 -1.00 1.00 -0.79 2.20 0.55
DEM/ Max. 40.0 41.0 5.00 5.00 8.24 10.76 373.42
USD Min. -41.0 0.0 -5.00 1.00 -10.76 0.00 0.00
Std.dev. 8.0 6.7 1.73 0.83 2.92 1.79 30.71
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